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2Is the model of self-correcting science and cumulative knowledge growth a fitting description
of the contemporary world of academic research? An active debate about whether this is the
case has recently developed, both among academics (e.g., Ioannidis, 2005; 2008; 2012) and
the popular press. Other critics have joined, arguing that there is a ‘credibility crisis’ in
several scientiﬁc disciplines, including psychology (Nosek et al., 2012), management (Bettis,
2012), and several branches of the biological and human sciences (e.g., Jennions and Moller,
2002; Ioannidis, 2005).1 The word ‘crisis’ refers to a widespread concern that there is a
reproducibility problem due to a sizable fraction of published findings being type-I errors, or
‘false positives’ (i.e., scientific ‘discoveries’ of statistical relations that are in fact not true).
Given the great importance of science and the amount of resources with which society
entrusts it, an excess of false positives constitutes a severe problem.
This credibility concern has led to the development of empirical studies that offer a
birds-eye view of the literature. Many of these developments have taken place in psychology,
with methodological advances (e.g., Simonsohn, 2015) special issues in elite journals (e.g.,
Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012) and large scale collaborations (Open Science Collaboration,
2012) having been devoted to the topic. This, in its turn, has led to a heated debate (e.g.,
Gilbert et al., 2016) regarding the state of the discipline. Given the import of the potential
problem and the substantial methodological differences of economics from biomedical
disciplines and psychology, one may ask: are these techniques and insights transferable to
economics? And, should they be applied more frequently?
Importantly, the relative degree to which economics research suffers from the
reproducibility problem is still not fully understood. Camerer et al. (2016) replicated several
well-known experiments in economics following the approach of large-scale replication of
1 The discussion has been so diverse and multidisciplinary that different fields have been using different terms to refer to the crisis, spurning
some confusion. Goodman et al. (2016) solidify the existing discussion by proposing a general terminology to refer to key relevant concepts
such as different types of reproducibility.
3the Open Science Collaboration. Based on a smaller number of replications, Camerer and
colleagues found that experimental economics research published in top journals is more
reproducible than psychological research. The crisis from other disciplines and the novel
focus on reproducibility have also spurred responses, including the new Berkeley Initiative
for Transparency in the Social Sciences and the launch of the Journal of the Economic
Science Association devoted to methodology and replication. In addition to proposing
replicability strategies employed in other disciplines, it is important to examine whether it is
possible to employ tools from the new discipline of meta-research (Ioannidis et al., 2015) to
identify and explore the critical dimensions of the reproducibility of economic research.
In this paper we follow this approach. We first add structure to the concept of
‘measuring the credibility of a research’ using an extension of the Bayesian framework
employed in Ioannidis (2005) and Maniadis et al. (2014) to derive the Post-Study Probability
(ܲܵܲ ) that an association is true. Our framework shows that to assess if we should update our
priors upon receiving new results, we should be interested in much more than p-values.
Indeed, any appropriate updating requires information not only on received p-values, but also
critically depends on research priors and statistical power of the experiment. We illustrate
how the nature of the inference problem, given current practices, can lead to unreliable results
and we discuss the lack of quantification of research priors and statistical power in
economics. But, even if initial results are unreliable, does replication not ensure that the
economics literature is credible as a whole?
We develop a model of replications that allows us to pinpoint the conditions for
replications to succeed in safeguarding the credibility of our discipline. Indeed, replication
has broad reach, as it can be powerful even when replication research is itself subject to
research biases. Our model shows that, naturally, a research design with large average power
lends itself to faster convergence to the truth. Perhaps surprisingly, this entails that in the
4presence of a set of replication results containing both successes and failures our posteriors
can be particularly low if the relevant designs had high average power.
We then perform a pilot meta-study of experimental economics, the sub-discipline of
empirical economics with arguably the best a priori credibility (Harrison and List, 2004;
Duflo, 2006; Angrist and Pischke, 2010).2 Our approach is to emulate a meta-research model
from psychology (Makel et al., 2012). Our empirical attempt reveals substantial difficulties in
translating the methodology to economics, partly stemming from the lack of a tradition in
meta-research in our discipline. Developing such a tradition will enhance the potential of
quantitative methods to study reproducibility practices and outcomes in economics. 3
However, it will also come at a cost, since it entails some effort by individual researchers to
specify primary hypotheses and to be clear about the type of study they are conducting
(original study, conceptual replication, etc.).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the basic
framework of analysis and provides thought examples. Section 2 discusses the existing
evidence in economics. Section 3 presents the model of biased replication and its implications
for inference. Section 4 describes our empirical study and presents its results. Section 5
addresses what our empirical results entail within the model of replication. Section 6
concludes with a discussion of future research avenues.
1. Newly Discovered Associations: A Methodological Appraisal
Given publication of a newly discovered finding, how much confidence should we have that
it is true? Following Maniadis et al. (2014), we use a framework developed in the life
2 In our empirical study, we focus on the sub-discipline of experimental economics, but our approach speaks generally to empirical analyses.
In fact, experimental economics is a limiting case of empirical economics in which researchers have higher degrees of control on the data-
generation process. Therefore, it can constitute the basis for comparison to other empirical fields in economics. For Ioannidis and
Doucouliagos ‘experimental designs have inherently better protection from many confounding biases than observational data’(Ioannidis and
Doucouliagos, 2013, p. 4), a view that recent empirical evidence appears to corroborate by reporting that experimental economics exhibits
abnormal patterns of statistical results to a smaller degree than other empirical fields in economics (Brodeur et al., 2016).
3 In this issue, Ioannidis et al. (forthcoming) illustrate the potential of meta-research: they find that the median statistical power in
economics is at most 18% and that the typical reported result is exaggerated by 100%.
5sciences (Wacholder et al., 2004; Ioannidis, 2005) to assess the fraction of findings
corresponding to false positives; and, therefore, to derive a measure of the confidence with
which we should view empirical results. The model pertains to classical experiments with
simple linear hypotheses, which are not only easy to model, but also whose design facilitates
replication attempts.
We denote ݊ as the number of research questions4 examined in a specific field, ߨ݊ of
which are actually true.5 Using standard terminology, ߙ is the typical significance level in the
field (usually ߙ = 0.05) and 1 − ߚ is the typical power of an experimental design in this
field. We can think of the process with which ‘Nature’ determines whether two phenomena
are associated with each other as a random experiment. Using this interpretation ,ߨ is a
probability, and we are interested in the Post-Study Probability (PSP) that a research finding
is true. The PSP is given by dividing the number of true associations declared true by the
number of all associations which are declared true:
ܲܵܲ = (1 − ߚ)ߨ(1 − ߚ)ߨ+ ߙ(1 − ߨ). (1)
It is natural to ask: what factors can affect the PSP and, in general, our confidence in
the published literature? Several factors are relevant for a given discipline: ( )݅ research priors
and the existence of structured theory testing, (݅݅) study power and sample size, (݅݅ )݅ biases
and conflicts of interest, ( ݅ݒ) researcher competition in the presence of publication bias, and(ݒ) the frequency of replication studies. Point ( ݅ݒ) is discussed in Maniadis et al. (2014) and(ݒ) will be tackled thoroughly in our main model. We shall now expand on the first three
factors.
4 Each question examines an ‘association’ or ‘relationship’ between variables, and thus we shall be using the terms ‘association’,
‘relationship’, and ‘research question’ interchangeably.
5ߨ can also be defined as the prior probability that the alternative hypothesis߅ଵ is actually true when performing a statistical test of the null
hypothesis ߅଴ (see Wacholder et al., 2004): that is, ߨ = Pr{ܪଵ݅ݏݐݎݑ }݁.
61.1. Priors and Theory Testing vs. Exploration
From equation 1, a key determinant of the PSP is the level of the research prior,ߨ. To
illustrate the importance of this variable, let us start from the hypothetical case where for a
given scientific field, ‘surprise’ discoveries (rather than theory-driven ones) are necessary in
order to achieve publication in a major academic journal. For simplicity, assume that the
research design has maximum power (ߚ = 0) and the usual ߙ = 0.05. Further, assume that
‘surprise’ associations are those findings that are ‘1 in 100 results.’ That is, of 100 potentially
surprising associations studied, one is known to be true (ߨ = 0.01) . In this case, the
probability of both a true association and a rejection of the null hypothesis is 0.01*1 = 0.01.
And, the probability that there is both no association and rejection of the null hypothesis is
0.99*0.05 = 0.0495. Thus, the total probability of rejection is 0.01 + 0.0495 = 0.0595. Thus,
when a researcher rejects the null hypothesis in this case, there is an 84 percent
(0.04995/0.0595) chance that there is no association (a false positive). Accordingly, there is
only a 16 percent chance that the statistically significant finding represents a true association.
The question of where exactly these priors come from is a fundamental problem for
Bayesian analysis. One possible answer is straightforward: it is past scientific knowledge that
informs our priors for future explorations. In this way, theory is the bridge between existing
knowledge and predictions about the results of future studies. Accordingly, in disciplines
where empirical studies are based on well-grounded theory, we should expect that research
priors are ‘better defined’ (i.e., theory driven research has higher priors, ceteris paribus). On
the other hand, in disciplines where exploration and ‘discovery’ tends to play a larger role
than theory, we should expect more sceptical priors.
Of course, for a given research question, theory cannot change the probability that the
association is indeed true, so some explanation is in order. An example can illustrate the
argument that theory-driven research is associated with more informed priors. In genetic
7epidemiology there are a huge number of genes that may potentially be associated with some
health conditions. Accordingly, since empirical studies are typically not theory-driven, meta-
researchers have made the claim that studies that uncover very strong statistical associations
should be seen with much skepticism and their findings be assigned a very low PSP
(Ioannidis, 2005). The reason is that, since there is no a priori reason to expect one particular
gene plays the specific role discovered by a given study, any reasonable prior for the
association should be in the order of one in the millions.
On the other hand, provided there is a plausible biological mechanism that can be
used to pinpoint the specific gene that is being examined in a given epidemiological study,
the prior should be associated with the plausibility of the theoretical mechanism and not just
with the number of possible genes. In general, the existence of a tradition of theory-testing
tends to change the set of questions that are being examined in a discipline, causing a
selection effect of focusing on more plausible associations. 6
1.2. Power and Sample Size
Equation (1) suggests that a research finding is more likely to be true than false if [(1 − ߚ)ߨ/
(1 − ߨ)] > ߙ: that is, for a given significance level the pre-study odds are beneficial and the
study is powerful enough. This conveniently allows us to express PSP as a function of sample
size via the power of the experimental design. Under several simplifying assumptions, List et
al. (2011) show that the optimal sample sizes for an experimental control (ܰ଴∗) and treatment
6 The direct channel – through higher priors – is not the only channel through which theory-testing translates into a high PSP. We also
hypothesise that rigorous theory beneficially interacts with other critical variables that will be discussed later. First, let us consider journal
editors’ preferences. Editors are less likely to have a strong preference for ‘positive results’ if some submitted paper has a strong theoretical
component, for two reasons. First, the theoretical model might in itself be considered a contribution, and second, both confirming and
disconfirming formal theories is interesting in its own right. Accordingly, empirical studies with rigorous theory reduce the risk of the
results being kept in the ‘file drawer’. This should result in less pronounced ‘publication bias’ for this type of research, all else equal. If the
argument that theory-testing results in weaker preference for positive results (captured by the variable μ in Section 1.3 below) is true, this
could also attenuate the link between ‘research degrees of freedom’ and ‘research bias’. The absence of rigorous standards and established
practices will be more detrimental whenever authors have much to gain from a particular type of result. Put differently, theory-driven (as
opposed to exploratory) research in economics ameliorates a ‘conflict of interest’ inherent in many of the incentives that academics face.
8( ܰଵ∗ ) group are equal to ܰ ଴∗ = ܰଵ∗ = ܰ ∗ = ቂ2൫ݖఈ/ଶ + ݖఉ൯ଶ(ߪ ߜ⁄ )ଶቃ. 7 Here, 2 is the
conditional variance of the outcome of both control and treatment groups,  is the minimum
economically relevant difference between mean control and treatment outcomes, and ݖ௣ is the
p-quantile of the standard normal distribution.
If one follows the literature and uses a significance level of 0.05 , and sets
experimental power to 0.80 , we have ݖఈ/ଶ = 1.96 and ݖఉ = 0.84 from standard normal
tables. However, we may also consider lower power levels, say 0.50 or 0.20, which can be
observed in the literature (Zhang and Ortmann, 2013; Ioannidis et al., forthcoming). Then,
the ݖఉ from standard normal tables are 0.00 and −0.84. In order to detect a one (resp. one-
half) standard deviation change in the outcome variable, this would lead to sample sizes of
ܰ ∗ = 8 (resp. ܰ ∗ = 31) with a 0.50 power and ܰ ∗ = 3 (resp. ܰ ∗ = 10) with a 0.20 power.
This is in contrast with the sample size ܰ ∗= 16 (resp. ܰ ∗= 63) that we would need in order to
achieve power equal to 0.80. To obtain a clearer idea about the relationship between sample
size and the PSP, notice that the approximate power function is:
1 − ߚ = ܲݎ{ܼ < − ఈܼ ଶ⁄ ݋ݎܼ > ఈܼ ଶ⁄ |ܪଵ݅ݏݐݎݑ }݁ =
= 1 − Φ ቀܼ ఈ ଶ⁄ − √ܰߜ ඥ2ߪଶൗ ቁ+Φቀ− ఈܼ ଶ⁄ − √ܰߜ ඥ2ߪଶൗ ቁ=
= Φቀ− ఈܼ ଶ⁄ + √ܰߜ ඥ2ߪଶൗ ቁ+Φቀ− ఈܼ ଶ⁄ − √ܰߜ ඥ2ߪଶൗ ቁ,
with Φ(z) being the cumulative density function of a standard normal random variable. It
follows that PSP can be rewritten as:
7 These optimal sample sizes are the smallest sample sizes that achieve a given power level (1 − ߚ) for a fixed significance level ߙ and
variance ߪଶ. The researcher makes a two-sided test of the hypothesis thatߤ଴ = ߤଵ, and specifies a minimum scientifically relevant level of
the treatment effect (ߜ= ߤଵ− ߤ଴ > 0). The estimation of power is based on the sampling distribution that occurs when the true effect
equals δ. In our calculations here we assume that the experimental treatment might affect the mean, but not the variance of the outcomes. 
Furthermore, the sample size is assumed to be large enough, such that the normal distribution is a good approximation to the ݐdistribution
that is typically used in hypothesis testing.
9ܲܵܲ = ቈΦቆ− ఈܼ ଶ⁄ + √ܰߜ√2ߪଶቇ+Φቆ− ఈܼ ଶ⁄ − √ܰߜ√2ߪଶቇ቉ߨ
ቈΦቆ− ఈܼ ଶ⁄ + √ܰߜ
√2ߪଶቇ+Φቆ− ఈܼ ଶ⁄ − √ܰߜ√2ߪଶቇ቉ߨ+ ߙ(1 − ߨ). (2)
This is increasing in N. Thus, as N becomes larger, PSP increases. That is, from equation 2
we learn that we should be more secure in our initial findings with larger sample sizes, and by
specifying the terms of this equation we may gain quantitative insights by just how much.
From this, one might conclude that if a treatment effect is statistically significant with
ܰ observations, it will necessarily be statistically significant with ܰ + 1 observations. The
model highlights that this common intuition is flawed. What is true is that as N increases we
are more likely to find the truth—that is because as N grows the empirical estimate
approaches the truth. The implication is that if a research study rejects a true null (reports a
false positive), it is not more likely to reject a true null with a larger sample size. In fact, it is
less likely to report a false positive because a larger sample size increases the chances of
finding the truth.8
As we shall show later in our model with biased replication (which abstracts away
from publication bias), these insights are not generally true when we conduct inference from
multiple replications and evidence is mixed. In ex-post inference, if we condition on a set of
results that have positive as well as negative replications, the negative ones are extremely
unlikely to be obtained under a true association if studies are well-powered.
8 If one extends the simple thought experiment presented in Section 1.1 to cases of empirical designs that are less than maximally powered,
the results become quite stark. For instance, consider the case of a study with a 0.20 power, which, as the evidence indicates, might not be
very uncommon. Using the assumptions on the prior above, we have that the probability of both a true association and a rejection of the null
hypothesis is 0.01*0.2 = 0.002. And, the probability that there is both no association and rejection of the null hypothesis is
0.99*0.05=0.0495. Thus, the total probability of rejection is 0.002 + 0.0495 = 0.0515. When a researcher rejects the null hypothesis in this
case, there is a 97 percent (0.04995/0.0515) chance that there is no association. Thus, whereas now there is only a 3 percent chance that the
result represents a true association, with a fully powered design there was a 16 percent chance. Again, this comes in contrast with the
extended model that will be presented in Section 3, where more power does not always result in higher ܲܵܲ in ex-post inference. The case
of a unique successful study is a special case of that model.
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1.3. Research Bias
To all the factors described above, one should add the subjective element that stems from the
fact that study design and empirical data analysis involves a series of subjective choices,
which are likely to bias research outcomes whenever the interests of researchers favour a
specific pattern of results. This does not necessarily entail fraud, but most often is caused by a
natural human tendency to interpret ambiguous signals in a self-serving way (Babcock and
Loewenstein, 1997; Dawson et al., 2002). The ‘research bias’ ݑ is defined as ‘the
combination of various design, data, analysis, and presentation factors that tend to produce
research findings when they should not be produced’ (Ioannidis, 2005, p. 697). Notice that
the bias does not refer to chance variability or ideological bias in researchers’ beliefs
(Maniadis et al., 2014). In the model, the research bias is captured by assuming that a fraction
ݑ of the times where a non-significant outcome should not be declared, in fact it is declared
significant (because of research bias). Hence, the PSP in the presence of bias (PSPBias) will be
equal to:
ܲܵܲ ஻௜௔௦ = (1 − ߚ)ߨ+ ߚߨݑ(1 − ߚ)ߨ+ ߚߨݑ+ [ߙ+ (1 − ߙ)ݑ](1 − ߨ) . (3)
The derivative of this expression with respect to ݑ is negative if ߨ(1 − ߨ)[ߙ+ ߚ−1] < 0, which is typically true. The concept of bias is multi-dimensional, and in particular we
hypothesise that ݑ = (݂ ,݀ߤ,ߦ). For illustration, in what follows we use the simple functional
form ݑ = ݀ߤߦ. The first determinant of the bias, represented by the parameter 0 ≤ ݀ ≤1, captures the ‘degrees of freedom’ in research (Ioannidis, 2005). This represents, for
instance, whether the methodology in a given discipline is mature and standardised. When
݀ = 0, no research bias is possible because some flexibility is necessary for biased research
to occur. The second component, represented by the parameter 0 ≤ ߤ≤ 1, reflects the degree
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to which researchers have less opportunities to publish non-significant outcomes, which
entails strong preferences for some specific pattern of outcomes (it is not only good
methodology that matters). As long as there is no preference for positive results (ߤ= 0) there
can be no distortion of the sort we have assumed here (which simply tends to declare results
as significant when they should not be declared as such).
The third component of the bias, represented by the parameter 0 ≤ ߦ≤ 1, measures
the publication pressure and captures the publish-or-perish culture (or, put differently,
represents the returns from publication). The variables ߤ and ߦmediate the transformation of
degrees of freedom into biased research – there is empirical evidence that publication
pressures tend to increase the bias (Fanelli, 2010a). It is the interaction of these three
dimensions that generates the bias; in our illustration, this happens in a multiplicative way:
degrees of freedom leave room for biases that materialise if there is both an editorial aversion
to papers with non-significant effects and strong incentives for publication.
2. The Existing Empirical Evidence in Economics
Now that we have seen the factors that are likely to affect the credibility of economic results,
we examine whether evidence exists in economics that will allow us to characterise these
factors. We also consider the issue of whether these factors are quantifiable. In the discussion
that follows, we assign a primary role to experimental economics. Angrist and Pischke (2010)
prominently advanced the idea that the increasing use of the experimental method protects
the credibility of empirical economics. It has been argued that experimental research has
prima-facie additional credibility relative to observational studies (Harrison and List, 2004;
Duflo, 2006; Angrist and Pischke, 2010; Ioannidis and Doucouliagos, 2013). Furthermore,
experiments have an increasingly prominent role in economics: in fact, there has been more
than a tenfold growth in the number of experimental studies published in top-five economic
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journals in the last 40 years (e.g., Nikiforakis and Slonim, 2015). Accordingly, the field of
experimental economics represents a positive benchmark for investigating the credibility of
economics.
Let us first consider what we know about research priors: does it seem to be the case
that ‘surprising results’ are necessary in order to publish in economics? Economics tends to
be theory driven. In fact, young PhD students are immersed in the realm of formal
(normative) theory much more than other disciplines. This is still true despite a reverse trend
in recent years, especially in applied microeconomics, where structural analysis has become
somewhat less popular. A movement in experimental economics toward structural work
should also be noted (see Della Vigna et al., 2012, and the references therein). This focus on
theory may have beneficial side effects for the reliability of empirical economics, since the
benchmark predictions of standard economic theory serve as a protective firewall against
excessively exploratory research. Hence, the predominance of formal economic theory should
result in much experimental research going beyond exploration to theory testing, a feature
that tends to increase priors in our model.
What does empirical evidence tell us about the degree to which economics hinges
upon theory? Card et al. (2011) focused on a particular set of empirical studies, field
experiments, and estimated that 68% of field experiments are purely exploratory, lacking any
explicit theory.9 The other evidence concerning priors that we are familiar with is the work of
DeLong and Lang (1992), who examine major economics journals to find articles in which
the central null hypotheses set forth by the authors was not rejected. Under their model, they
estimated that none of the unrejected nulls is true. Their main interpretation of this evidence
9 The difficulties in categorizing what a theory-driven study is need to be emphasised. Many disciplines, such as psychology, employ theory
but not explicit mathematical models. In addition, ex post theorizing after the results is a major confound that can make accurate
measurement very difficult. Card et al. (2011) use a relatively mechanistic definition of a theory-testing study, considering as ‘theory-
driven’ any study that presents at least one line of formal mathematical modelling.
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is that economics journals tend to publish null results only if the pre-study priors of a true
association are particularly high.
What do we know about the power of empirical designs in economics? In economics
there are limited domains where power analysis is discussed, and especially presented
formally in papers (one of these exceptions is revealed preference tests: see the review in
Andreoni and Harbaugh, 2005). 10 Importantly, it is still possible to estimate power
retrospectively by means of meta-analytic estimates (or, in general, assumptions about the
actual effect size). Until now, there seems to have been very little relevant research in
economics: the only analysis we are familiar with is Zhang and Ortman (2013), who estimate
the post-hoc statistical power for the dictator-game experiments included in the meta-analysis
by Engel (2011) and find median power equal to 0.25. This (scarcity of) evidence should be
juxtaposed with psychology and related disciplines such as marketing, which have a much
deeper tradition of retrospective power analysis.11
Filling the power gap in economics, in an accompanying paper of this Features issue,
Ioannidis et al. (forthcoming) uses 159 economic meta-analyses of 6,700 studies and over
64,000 estimates to assess statistical power. In particular, they find that across these
literatures, the median of the median power in each literature is, at most, 18%. In addition,
the median proportion of adequately powered studies (power ≥ 0.8) in a given research
literature is no more than 10.5%.
10 One reason to expect a low level of power in economics, as List et al. (2011) emphasize, is that power analysis is not appealing to
economists. The reason is that our usual way of thinking is related to the standard regression model. This model considers the probability of
observing the coefficient that we observed, if the null hypothesis is true. Power analysis explores a different question: if the alternative is
true, what is the probability of the estimated coefficient lying outside the confidence interval defined when we tested our null hypothesis?
11 Cohen (1962) started this line of research, analysing the 1960 volume of the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, and found a
median power equal to 0.18 for small effect sizes, 0.48 for medium effect sizes (the relevant case according to the author) and 0.83 for large
effect sizes. Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) review the evidence about a series of more than ten studies in the seventies and eighties that
retrospectively calculated power following Cohen’s lead. These studies were not only in psychology but also in other social sciences such as
sociology and marketing. Studies from psychology and the cognate disciplines of communication and education found similar results as
Cohen (1962). However, studies in the fields of journalism, sociology and marketing found considerably higher average power for medium
effect sizes (0.71 − 0.89). Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) also conducted the same exercise for the 1984 issue of the Journal of Abnormal
Psychology and found that not a single study out of 54 relevant papers calculated the power of their design or discussed their choice of
sample size. For the papers of that issue, the authors found median power 0.44 for medium effect sizes (compare with Cohen’s 0.46). Very
recently, Bakker et al. (2012) estimated median power equal to 0.35, not very different from the results of Zhang and Ortman (2013).
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Other key parameters include the degree of competition among research teams in
economics and publication pressure in economics relative to other fields (in our model, ߦ).
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any formal study addressing these questions. One would
need to resort to anecdotal evidence for insights. On the one hand, the functioning of the
economics knowledge system is characterised by long-run uncertainty about the intrinsic
value of research and by a funnel-shaped publication system (e.g., Oswald, 2007). On the
other hand, there has been a significant creation of new prestigious journals by major
economic associations. In addition, many of the aforementioned features of the system are
common to other competitive disciplines, such as bio-medical sciences (e.g., Young et al.,
2008). Additional anecdotal evidence indicates that economics is not considered among the
most difficult disciplines for advancing the academic ladder, especially in the US. Fresh
economics PhDs compete for assistant professor jobs, whereas in the biomedical and natural
sciences they need to pass through a series of post docs. In any event, we know very little on
ߦ.
The field where evidence in economics is not lacking concerns pure publication bias.
For instance, Doucouliagos and Stanley (2013) examine publication biases across different
economic literatures and show how these biases depend on the degree of competition
between schools of thought. This evidence (along with the interdisciplinary comparisons by
Fanelli, 2010b), point toward a moderately high value of ߤ for economics, since there exists
disproportionately many positive empirical results. But, notice that hard evidence – for
example in the form of a study such as Franco et al. (2014), who utilise a unique
preregistration pool to derive an estimate of publication bias – has not been provided yet in
economics.
Finally, is there evidence for the degree to which economic researchers are biased at
the individual level? The survey evidence due to List et al. (2001) indicates that a non-trivial
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fraction of economists (about 4%) has committed a serious research crime (such as data
falsification) at least once. Feld et al. (2012) report evidence consonant with the insights in
List et al. (2001), and reveal that more than 30% of total researchers admit using strategies
that would bias behaviour towards reporting positive results (selectively report of findings,
stopping experimentation when finding desired results, etc.). These results point to large
empirical degrees of freedom and the potential for research bias, although evidence for the
publication pressure in economics relative to other disciplines is lacking.
3. Can we Trust Replications to Ameliorate the Credibility Problem?
We have already seen that the Bayesian model points to key parameters that affect the
credibility of results: p-values, priors, theory-testing, power, researchers’ incentives, degrees
of freedom, etc. Yet, unfortunately in economics we do not have enough rigorous evidence
about these variables. Still, it might well be the case that the protective guardianship of
replications ensures the reliability of received results.
Before moving to our framework, we should take care to address what is actually a
replication. In our theoretical model, we employ the second notion of replication as defined
in Levitt and List (2009): implementing an experiment under the same protocol as the
original experiment to check whether similar results can be obtained using different
subjects.12 However, research bias is likely to affect original research from several angles.
Since there should be no presumption that replication is impervious to bias, one can wonder
if replication can achieve its role when it is afflicted by biases itself. This begs the need to
12 To add more detail, in the empirical part we use the similar – but extended – definitions of direct and conceptual replications of Schmidt
(2009), summarised by Makel et al. (2012):
In a direct replication, the new research team essentially seeks to duplicate the sampling and experimental procedures of the original
research by following the same ‘experimental recipe’ provided in the methods section of the original publication […] In a conceptual
replication, the original methods are not copied but rather purposefully altered to test the rigor of the underlying hypothesis. Whereas
direct replication examines the authenticity of the original data, in conceptual replication, the replicator tests the construct and not the
datum.
(Makel et al., 2012, p. 538)
In this regard Schmitdt states: ‘Whereas a direct replication is able to produce facts, a conceptual replication may produce understanding’
[Italics in original]. (Schmitdt, 2009, p. 95).
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model explicitly how new evidence helps us update our beliefs in the presence of potentially
biased replication research.
When no research bias is at work, Moonesinghe et al. (2007) and Maniadis et al.
(2014) show that a few replications are enough for our beliefs to converge to the truth. It is
important to emphasise that in the background of this basic model there is publication bias.13
For their calculations it is assumed that there are at leastݎsuccessful replications out of ݊
trials, meaning that the other (݊− ݎ) studies are potentially unpublished, and therefore we do
not know if they are positive or negative. We want to work in an environment where there is
no such implicit publication bias.
To establish this environment, we assume that it is known that there are exactly ݊
‘independent’ replications of each study, and all results from these replications are published.
Of course, we are fully in agreement with the concept that publication bias afflicts replication
studies, but we focus on inference that can be made in the presence of replication that is
biased at the researcher level.
We illustrate our ideas in four models of replication. In the first, our benchmark
model, only unbiased replication takes place. In the second, only biased replication exists,
with a bias aligned with the original result (we call this an environment of ‘sympathetic
replications’). According to the third model of ‘adversarial replication’, replication attempts
are biased towards providing evidence opposing the original finding. The fourth, and final,
model assumes that there are some unbiased, some sympathetic, and some adversarial
replicating researchers. We are interested in examining how each of these replication models
helps us to converge to the truth in terms of our posteriors. Does the existence of biases entail
that replication can no longer serve its purpose? How does it depend on the environment?
13 With the term ‘publication bias’ we merely refer to the tendency of journals to prefer results of one particular type. This does not include
any type of bias from the part of researchers. This model assumes that all biases at the researcher level (such as selectively reporting results)
are lumped up within ‘research bias’.
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Of course, ‘[t]he patterns of bias can be complex and may also depend on the timing
of the research results and their relationship with previously published work’. (Pfeiffer et al.,
2011, p. 1). Hence, we will work with simplifying assumptions that will deliver tractable
models that provide useful insights. We assume that there is an initial positive result having
declared the existence of an association and that it is known that there is a fixed number ݊of
replication attempts. Consider the random variable ܺ , namely the number of successful
replication studies,14 distributed according to the Binomial distribution with probability of
success ݌ and number of trials .݊ The probability of finding ݎsuccessful replications out of ݊
trials is given by: (ܾ݌ǡݎǡ݊ ) ൌ ܲݎ{ܺ ൌ ݎ} ൌ ቀ݊
ݎ
ቁ݌௥(ͳെ ݌)௡ି௥.
The key question is: what is the Post-Study Probability ሺܲ ܵܲ ௥௘௣) of a given positive
finding to be true after ݎsuccessful replications out of ݊ total replication studies? We are
particularly interested in the updating of our beliefs due to replication, relative to the beliefs
held after the initial study was published – which are captured by the priorsߨin our model.
3.1. Unbiased, Sympathetic and Adversarial Replications
Conditional on a true association (and given power ͳെ ߚሻ, the probability of observing ݎ
successes in ݊ replications is ܲݎ{ܺ ൌ ݎ} ൌ (ܾͳെ ߚǡݎǡ݊ ) ൌ ቀ݊
ݎ
ቁ(ͳെ ߚ)௥ߚ௡ି௥. Conditional
on a false association (and given significance level ߙሻ, this probability is ܲݎ{ܺ ൌ ݎ} =(ܾߙǡݎǡ݊ ) ൌ ቀ݊
ݎ
ቁ(ߙ)௥(ͳെ ߙ)௡ି௥. Accordingly, our posterior after all the evidence is:
ܲܵܲ ௥௘௣ = [௉௥௢௕௔௕௜௟௜௧௬௢௙௧௛௘௔௦௦௢௖௜௔௧௜௢௡௕௘௜௡௚௧௥௨௘௔௡ௗ௛௔௩௜௡௚௥௦௨௖௖௘௦௦௘௦௜௡௡௧௥௜௔௟௦][௉௥௢௕௔௕௜௟௜௧௬௢௙௛௔௩௜௡௚௥௦௨௖௖௘௦௦௘௦௜௡௡௧௥௜௔௟௦] =
= (ܾͳെ ߚǡݎǡ݊ )ߨ(ܾͳെ ߚǡݎǡ݊ )ߨ൅ (ܾߙǡݎǡ݊ )(ͳെ ߨ). (4)
14 There are many possible criteria that can be used to define a ‘successful replication’. For instance, a replication study may be considered
successful whenever the statistical method used in the original paper delivers a p-value lower than 0.05 when applied to the replication data
(e.g., Camerer et al., 2016).
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Recall that ߨ is the probability of the association being true after the original (positive) result
has been published.
Now, let us consider the possibility of researcher bias in the conduct of replications.
First, a bias in favour of the original result may exist if the replication is made by research
teams friendly to the original research team. In accordance with Ioannidis (2005), we assume
that in each occasion where the replication would have been declared unsuccessful, it will be
declared successful (meaning, positive), a fraction 0 < ݒ≤ 1 of the time, due to the bias.
Now, what is the probability of the association being true and declared true in ݎout of݊
replications? Conditional on the association being true, it will be declared true in a given
replication study either because the study will not make a type-II error, or, if the study falls
prey to type-II error, because of the bias ݒ. Hence, the Bernoulli probability of each ‘success’
must now be given by the ‘sympathetic bias’ formula: (1 − ߚ) + ߚݒ.
Similarly, if the association is false, it will be declared true in a given replication
study either because the study makes type-I error, or, if the study avoids type-I error, because
of the bias ݒ. Hence, the Bernoulli probability of each ‘success’ must now be given by ߙ+
(1 − ߙ)ݒ. In other words, conditional on a true association there is a chance [ܾ(1 − ߚ) +
ߚݒ,ݎ, ]݊ of declaring ݎsuccessful replications out of ݊ total replications and conditional on
false there is a chance [ܾߙ+ (1 − ߙ)ݒ,ݎ, ]݊ of declaring ݎ successes out of ݊replications.
Accordingly, the ܲܵܲ in the presence of sympathetic replication bias ݒbecomes:
ܲܵܲ ௌ
௥௘௣ = [ܾ(1 − ߚ) + ߚݒ,ݎ, ]݊ߨ[ܾ(1 − ߚ) + ߚݒ,ݎ, ]݊ߨ+ ܾ [ߙ+ (1 − ߙ)ݒ,ݎ, ]݊(1 − ߨ). (5)
Now, let us assume that there is an ‘adversarial bias’ 0 < ߱ ≤ 1 in the opposite
direction, namely in the direction of declaring against the initial result (remember this result
was positive). This means that out of all cases where the result would have been declared
positive, it is actually declared negative (in other words, declared a failed replication) a
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fraction ߱ of the time. What is the probability of the association being true and declared true
in ݎout of݊ replications? Conditional on the association being true, it will be declared true in
a given replication study only if the study does not fall prey to type-II error, and at the same
time it avoids the ‘adversarial bias’. Hence the Bernoulli probability of each ‘success’ must
now be given by (1 − ߚ)(1 − ߱). Similarly, if the association is false, it will be declared true
in each replication study only if the study makes type-I error and simultaneously avoids the
‘adversarial bias’. Hence, the Bernoulli probability of each ‘success’ must now be given
byߙ(1 − ߱).
In other words, conditional on the association being true, there is a chance [ܾ(1 −
ߚ)(1 − ߱),ݎ, ]݊ of declaring ݎ successful replications out of ݊total replications , and
conditional on a false association there is a chance [ܾߙ(1 − ߱),ݎ, ]݊ of declaring ݎsuccessful
replications out of ݊total replications. Accordingly, the ܲܵܲ in the case of adversarial bias
becomes:
ܲܵܲ ஺
௥௘௣ = [ܾ(1 − ߚ)(1 − ߱),ݎ, ]݊ ∙ ߨ[ܾ(1 − ߚ)(1 − ߱),ݎ, ]݊ ∙ ߨ+ ܾ [ߙ(1 − ߱),ݎ, ]݊ ∙ (1 − ߨ). (6)
3.2. Heterogeneity across Replicating Teams
Now, let us assume that there is heterogeneity across replicating teams. In particular, a
fraction 0 < ߮ < 1 is sympathetic (with bias ݒas above), a fraction 0 < ߰ < 1 is adversarial
(with bias ߱ as above), and the remaining fraction (1 − ߮ − ߰) is neutral. What should the
academic community infer on the basis of observing ݎsuccessful replications out of ݊ total
replications?
Let us assume first that the association is true. Then, the probability of a given
replication being successful (declaring a positive result) is the weighted sum of the
probabilities of positive results for each type of researcher. Accordingly, each replication is a
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Bernoulli experiment with probability of success ଵ߯ ≡ ߮ ∙ [(1 − ߚ) + ߚݒ] + ߰ ∙[(1 − ߚ)(1 −
߱)]+ (1 − ߮ − ߰) ∙ (1 − ߚ).15 Now assume the association is false. Then, the probability of
a given replication being successful (meaning, declaring a positive result) is the weighted
sum of the probabilities of positive results for each type of researcher. Accordingly, each
replication is a Bernoulli experiment with probability of success ଶ߯ ≡ ߮ ∙ [ߙ+ (1 − ߙ)ݒ] +
߰ ∙[ߙ(1 − ߱)] + (1 − ߮ − ߰) ∙ ߙ.
Therefore, conditional on a true association there is a chance (ܾ ଵ߯,ݎ, )݊ of declaring ݎ
successful replications out of ݊total replications, and conditional on a false association there
is a chance (ܾ ଶ߯,ݎ, )݊ of declaring ݎ successful replications out of ݊total replications.
Finally, the ܲܵܲ in the heterogeneous case becomes:
ܲܵܲ ு
௥௘௣ = (ܾ ଵ߯,ݎ, )݊ ∙ ߨ(ܾ ଵ߯,ݎ, )݊ ∙ ߨ+ ܾ( ଶ߯,ݎ, )݊ ∙ (1 − ߨ). (7)
3.3 Updating on the Basis of Replications
Figure 1 illustrates the PSP as a function of the number of successful replications, when the
total number of replications is fixed to 10. That is, we follow our model and plot the PSP for
a number of successful replications out of 10 (denoted PSPrep) in Figure 1, assuming two
different power levels, and ߙ = 0.05,݊ = 10,ݒ= 0.3,߱ = 0.4,ߨ = 0.5 , ߮ = 0.33,߰ =0.33. We believe that the specification of Figure 1 is realistic with respect to the prior ߨ,
because as Ioannidis (2005) and Maniadis et al. (2014) have shown, it is not unreasonable to
expect that after the initial study our beliefs for the truthfulness of the association remain
small.
Insights from Figure 1 teach a few useful lessons. First, by comparing the left and
right panels, we see the importance of power: regardless of the chosen replication model,
15 Of course, by simply interpreting ߮and ߰ as the probabilities of a given replication having taken place by sympathetic and adversarial
authors, respectively, we need not invoke any assumption that replicators are randomly drawn.
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power importantly influences the PSP. We return to this point below. Second, in disciplines
where there is a strong element of competition we might generally expect replications to be
adversarial. Hence, our updating on the basis of a fixed number of replications should be
larger, relative to a discipline with neutral researchers, and much larger than in disciplines
with sympathetic replications.
Accordingly, in disciplines where there is an aversion to contradicting the authors of
initial studies we should feel less secure in using the standard Bayesian model when updating
– the role of replications for establishing convergence of beliefs to the truth is less powerful.
Using similar logic, this means that in a ‘sympathetic replicators’ environment more
successful replications are needed in order to establish the result. For instance, if we wish to
achieve ܲܵܲ of at least 80%, the left panel of Figure 1 shows that seven successful
replications are required, whereas only three replications are enough in the ‘adversarial
replicators’ regime. Figure 1 also importantly highlights the need to establish the regime in
which replication takes place, since different replication regimes entail very different
inference from a given pattern of replication results.
Figure 1. ܲܵܲ as a Function of Number of Replications out of 10 Attempts
a. (1 − β) = 0.7 b. (1 − β) = 0.2
Note: For the calculations, equations 1 and 5-7 were used while assuming that ߙ = 0.05,݊ = 10,ݒ= 0.3,߱ = 0.4,ߨ = 0.5,
߮ = 0.33,߰ = 0.33.
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Perhaps surprisingly, our model predicts that (for a large range of parameters)
conditional on a set of mixed replication results, disciplines where studies are known to be
more powerful can be associated with lower PSP. To illustrate, let us consider the derivatives
of the ܲܵܲ in each regime. For the unbiased regime the ܲܵܲ is decreasing in power (1 − ߚ)
as long as ߚ < [(݊− ݎ) ݊⁄ ], for the sympathetic replication regime the same holds if ߚ <[(݊− ݎ) (݊1 − ߥ)⁄ ] and for the adversarial regime it holds as long as ߚ <[ (݊1 − ߱) − ݎ] [ (݊1 − ߱)]⁄ . This non-monotonicity implies that in an environment of low
power (economics is one such environment, according to the results of Ioannidis et al.,
forthcoming) low success rates of replications may often be less condemning (in terms of the
PSP) relative to a high-power environment.
The intuition for this paradox is that more power is always beneficial ex ante, in order
to increase the chances of obtaining a positive result. However, at the ex-post stage it is often
the case that a given set of replication results is more likely to have originated from a true
association if the power is low, rather than high. The reason is simple: in our model we
condition on a number of replications that include successes as well as failures. If power is
high, numerous failures are very unlikely if the association is true, because the probability of
type-II error is low. If the evidence is mixed, it is possible that disciplines with low average
power feel more comfortable for the truthfulness of their results. Illustrating this point, the
right panel of Figure 1 shows that when (1-ߚ) = 0.2 the ܲܵܲ for low levels of replication is
higher than in the high-power environment (left panel) of Figure 1. In particular, in the
‘unbiased’ and ‘adversarial’ regimes, three replications are enough to establish a ܲܵܲ of at
least 0.8.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that despite the importance of replications, incentives to
conduct them in economics are low, since they are typically not valued as highly as original
contributions. In addition, a replication might not be viewed positively from the point of view
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of the authors of the initial study. Given these presumed incentives, it is worth exploring
whether the policies of top economic journals regarding the availability of data and
complementary material are enough to encourage replication studies. It is even possible that
actual replications may not be declared as such, especially those that contradict original
findings. These issues require systematic study and we shall now make a first step in that
direction, presenting a pilot study that attempts to quantitatively assess replication.16
4. A Pilot Study of Replication in Experimental Economics
We have seen how in the absence of relevant evidence about the credibility of initial findings,
the role of replication becomes critical. Replication is the cornerstone of the scientific
method, and we have shown that it should be considered a safeguard against the false
positives problem even if it is practiced with biases, and even if our studies have low power.
We now examine empirically the degree to which replication is playing its role for the
subfield of experimental economics. We use a large sample of papers from the most
prestigious economics journals to assess the feasibility of meta-research approaches in
providing an overview of the frequency with which replication has been conducted recently
in experimental economics. This will help to inform us about the following: on the basis of
how many replications do we update our beliefs about initial findings?
As emphasised earlier, we focus on studies of causal analyses in economics with
relatively simple hypotheses, typically based on reduced forms (standard experimental
techniques). This provides a benchmark to examine replicability, since many other fields in
economics employ complex structural analyses which make them difficult to replicate using
different data sets, especially since field evidence is constrained by the data availability.
16 Maniadis et al. (2015) discuss possible dis-incentives of initial researchers to have their work replicated, as well as recently proposed
solutions. Prominent among those proposals are journals devoted to replications, special grants for funding them, large-scale preregistered
replications (e.g. Camerer et al. 2016), (quasi-)adversarial collaborations (e.g., Alempaki et al., 2016), and editors enforcing direct
replications as a prerequisite for publication. Maniadis et al. (2015) also propose that incentivizing having one’s work replicated could
address important shortcomings of the current system.
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From experiments, experts would argue that they understand the robustness of
phenomena, such as preference reversal over a pair of alternatives conditional on the
elicitation method, giving in ultimatum games, the decline over time of cooperation in public
good games, and the convergence to the equilibrium in competitive markets with classic
double auctions design, to mention a few examples. What does a quantitative meta-research
study have to offer? First, often expert opinion might not be enough, as evidenced by the fact
that in Camerer et al. (2016)’s study, the predictive accuracy of experts about replicability
did not outperform objective indices such as sample size and p-value. Moreover, Della Vigna
and Pope (2016) find that several dimensions of expertise such as academic rank, citations
and even local expertise do not improve predictive forecasting performance for a series of
experimental treatments (on the other hand, confidence in one’s forecast is moderately
correlated with performance). Second, systematic meta-research studies allow the
examination of trends in the overall literature and facilitate quantification of critical
variables. This approach is complementary to expert opinion and can yield new insights,
especially in the current era characterised by enormous, fast-growing, scientific production
and increasing specialization. For instance, our pilot study finds that very few experiments in
the discipline are declared as replications, a practice that may make it difficult for obtaining
unambiguous meta-analytic summaries for certain effects.
There are several additional research questions that we aim to address. What fraction of
experimental economic papers in each journal, and in the whole literature, are replications?
How does experimental economics fare relative to other fields, such as experimental
psychology? 17 It has also been argued that many implicit replications take place in
experimental economics, in the form of ‘benchmark studies’ that emulate prior designs and
17 In psychology, Makel et al. (2012) examined the papers published in the top 100 journals (according to the 5-year impact factor) and
estimated the percentage of them that represent replications. They found that about 1% are replications, most of which are successful;
moreover about 80% of the total replications are ‘conceptual’ rather than ‘exact’. Similarly, less than 2.5% of research articles in marketing
are replications or ‘extensions with replication’ (Evanschitzky et al., 2007; Hubbard and Armstrong, 1994). However, when replications are
published, they tend to be strong contradictions of the initial findings about 50 percent of the time.
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serve as controls to compare new treatments. To what extent is the existence of these implicit
replications true, and how do reporting practices in the discipline affect the meta-researcher’s
capacity to measure replicability? In addition, how does the fraction and number of
replications move over time in the experimental economics literature? Do other parameters
such as authorship overlap, etc., seem to affect the rate of success of replications?
We used EBSCOhost to search into EconLit database (searching in EconLit via
EBSCOhost appears more easily manageable relatively to accessing EconLit directly). We
restricted our searches to the top 150 journals in economics according to the Eigenfactor
Score18 of ‘ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Reports 2013 Social Science Edition
(JCR for short).19 We first retrieved all documents published in English in the years 1975-
2014 in the identified top 150 journals in economics. Looking for experimental studies, we
restricted our search among the papers that used the root ‘experiment*’ anywhere in the
article. We then focused our attention on the subset of papers that used both the root
‘experiment*’ and ‘replicat*’ in order to analyse whether they represented actual replications
of experimental studies. Because the use of the root ‘replicat*’ is neither necessary nor
sufficient for a paper to contain a replication, we searched for replications in the totality of
experimental papers.20
To this end, we also considered papers that used the root ‘experiment*’ but not the
root ‘replicat*’. First, we wanted to learn how many of those papers reported actual
experiments. Hence, we first randomly selected a stratified21 sample of 2001 of these papers
18 The definition from the JCR interface states: ‘The Eigenfactor Score calculation is based on the number of times articles from the journal
published in the past five years have been cited in the JCR year, but it also considers which journals have contributed these citations so that
highly cited journals will influence the network more than lesser cited journals. References from one article in a journal to another article
from the same journal are removed, so that Eigenfactor Scores are not influenced by journal self-citation’.
19 A complete list of the top 150 journals can be obtained from JCR 2013 Social Science Edition (as described in the Online Appendix).
According to Eigenfactor Score in the ‘JCR 2013 Social Science Edition’ the American Economic Review is ranked 1st, while the National
Tax Journal is ranked 150th.
20 As noted above, many papers contain only one ‘arm’ of a given treatment that appeared in an earlier study. These studies were classified
as ‘quasi replications’. Such studies do not add to our knowledge in the same manner as basic replications since there is no actual ‘treatment
effect’ to compare with the original study. We choose to measure the quasi-replications because they are often invoked as salutary practices,
but their existence may give a potentially illusory sense of reproducibility in the discipline.
21 The total population of papers considered was stratified according to the year of publication. Then, sampling fractions were obtained from
the strata such that the sampling fractions would have been proportional to the total population of papers considered.
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and examined whether they constituted actual experimental studies. In the next stage of our
analysis, in order to verify the existence of ‘implicit’ replication studies,22 we carefully went
through 500 randomly selected studies among those that we categorised as experimental to
determine which studies constitute replications.
In the final part of our analysis, we went through all of the papers that we categorised
as replications (either having the root ‘replicat*’ or not) to categorise important variables that
may affect the degree to which replication studies tend to confirm the original results (we call
this ‘success rate’). Some of these variables include direct replication (vs. conceptual),
number of times the original study has been cited, overlap in the authorship of the original
and the replication, the replication being published in the same journal as the original study,
and others.23
In a recent paper, Duvendack et al. (2015) review all replications in economics and
among them are a few experimental studies. However, since their search of replications is not
systematic and their main focus is not on experimental economics, their evidence does not
inform us greatly about the frequency of replications in the experimental economic literature.
This is one of the variables that we are quite interested in determining.
4.1. Results
In total, 206,522 papers were retrieved, after searching for all papers in English in the top 150
journals according to the Eigenfactor Score of JCR. Among them, 8,886 papers contained the
22 Assuming that replication studies may score lower in terms of novelty in the eyes of other scholars, it could be possible that authors may
refrain from using the root ‘replicat*’ even when implementing a replication. By contrast, we do not anticipate any reasons that may make
authors of an experimental study avoid the use of the root ‘experiment*’; hence, if authors of experimental studies do not use the root
‘experiment*’ we expect that this would have happened for causes orthogonal to our research questions.
23 To examine the robustness and consistency of the categorizations of our research assistants, two of the authors conducted – for a sample
of articles – the three main tasks: determining which articles contained new experiments (task 1), determining which articles contained a
replication (task 2) and coding the individual characteristics of replications (task 3). We drew a sample equal to the greater between 10
papers and 2% of the total number of papers considered for each of the three aforementioned tasks completed by the research assistants. Our
consistency checks revealed that some of the categorizations were more demanding than others, revealing a great degree of subjectivity. In
particular, concerning the first task, 95% of results were consistent with the research assistants’ categorization. When it comes to task 2, the
agreement of authors’ judgement with the research assistants is about 81%. Finally, in reference to the third task, agreement between the
categorization of the authors and the research assistants was about 70%. Categories that revealed themselves as particularly demanding to
agree upon are the categories for ‘success’ and ‘replication type’. The lack of sufficient reporting in these difficult categories appears to be
an important factor undermining the scope for obtaining high quality data.
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term root ‘experiment’, with 1,158 papers containing both the roots ‘experiment*’ and
‘replicat*’. Examining studies using both the roots ‘experiment*’ and ‘replicat*’, we found
that 654 out of 1,158 papers contained actual experiments. In order to estimate the
representation of experiments in the literature as a whole, and to perform our robustness
check, we first randomly sampled (in a stratified fashion) 2,001 papers from the 7,754 papers
using the root ‘experiment*’, but not ‘replicat*’, and examined them in detail. Only 1,037 of
the 2,001 of the sampled papers were found to be actual experiments (see the online appendix
for the exact way in which we completed this task).
Second, we estimated the number of experimental papers that are actual replications,
among those that contained the root ‘replicat*’ and among those that did not. Among the
former 654 papers, 99 turned out to be actual replications. In order to examine the latter, we
drew randomly 500 papers among the 1,037 experimental papers that did not contain the root
‘replicat*’. Among those, only 12 were replication papers. Note that in our sample there are
111 replications of which 26 are quasi-replications, which we have excluded from the current
analysis.
In the end, we estimated the fraction of total papers in economics that contain new
experimental data to be 2.3%.24 The fraction of replication studies over the total number of
experimental studies is 4.2%, 25 of a similar magnitude as observed in marketing and
psychology (Evanschitzky et al., 2007; Makel et al., 2012). An interesting novel aspect of our
study design relative to Makel et al. (2012) is the fact that in our estimation we also try to
account for ‘implicit replication’ studies that do not declare themselves as such.
Concerning the replication results themselves, an interesting insight is that we found a
‘success rate’, based on 85 replications, of 42.3%. This means that roughly 40% of papers
24 Given that only 1,037/2,001 of the sampled papers are actual experiments, we estimate that 4,018 = (1,037/2,001 ∗ 7,754) of the7,754 papers using the root “experiment*”, but not “replicat*”, are actual experiments. Thus, the fraction of total papers in economics that
contain new experimental data is estimated to be 2.3% = [(4,018 + 654)/206,522] ∗ 100.
25 The fraction of actual replication papers out of the sample of 500 experimental papers not using the root “replicat*” is 0.024 =(12/500). Thus, the fraction of replication studies over the total number of experimental studies (which we estimate equal to 4,672 =4,018 + 654) was estimated to be 4.2% = [(0.024 ∗ 4,018 + 99)/4,672] ∗ 100.
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that were published as replication studies successfully replicated another experiment. This is
somewhat higher than the outcome of the recent large-scale replication initiative from
psychology (Open Science Initiative, 2015) and Duvendack et al. (2015), which both found a
success rate of about a third, while, also in psychology, Makel et al. (2012) found a very high
success rate of 73%.
Figure 2. Publications and Replication rates in the top 150 journal in Economics according to the Eigenfactor
Score
a. Number of publications in top economics journal b. Use of the roots ‘experiment*’ and ‘replicat*’ along
with replication rates in top economics journal
Note: In panel a., the bars represent the total number of articles published yearly in the top 150 economic journals. In
panel b., the dotted line reports the percentage of those publications that used the term “experiment*’; the dashed line
represents the percentage of those publications that used both the term ‘experiment*’ and the term ‘replicat*’. The solid line
describes the total fraction of papers that contain experimental replications relatively to the total yearly publications in the
top 150 economic journals.
Figure 2 illustrates the basic trends of economic research over time in our data. The
fraction of papers that use the root ‘experiment*’ increases steadily through time (recall that
we estimated that about half of those are actual experiments). In addition, the use of the root
‘replicat*’ seems also to increase through time. Notwithstanding, the replication rate appears
to be low and fairly stable over time. Table 1 contains detailed information from our set of 85
replications. As can be seen from this descriptive analysis, there is a much larger number of
replications in the last 15 years, and the success rate went up slightly. This certainly
represents a positive direction for empirical research in terms of replications.
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Table 1. Success Rates in Detail
Replication type Overall 1975-1999 2000-2014
By same authors (N=15) 26.7% 73.3%
Failed 13.3% 0.0% 18.2%
Mixed 40.0% 75.0% 27.3%
Successful 46.7% 25.0% 54.5%
By same journal (N=12) 41.7% 58.3%
Failed 16.7% 0% 28.6%
Mixed 33.3% 60% 14.3%
Successful 50.0% 40% 51.1%
All replications (N=85) 17.7% 82.3%
Failed 11.8% 6.7% 12.9%
Mixed 45.9% 53.3% 43.3%
Successful 42.3% 40.0% 42.8%
Direct (N=45) 11.1% 88.9%
Failed 11.1% 0.0% 12.5%
Mixed 44.4% 80.0% 40.0%
Successful 44.5% 20.0% 47.5%
Conceptual (N=40) 25% 75%
Failed 12.5% 10.0% 13.3%
Mixed 47.5% 40.0% 50.0%
Successful 40.0% 50.0% 36.7%
To delve more deeply into the determinants of replication success we employ ordered
logit estimations. Our dependent variable is ‘Success’, which assumes three values: 2
(replication success), 1 (mixed result), or 0 (replication failure). As explanatory variables, we
use the number of citations of the original study (i.e., ‘Citation Original Study’) together with
dummy variables for identical implementation protocol (i.e., Same Implementation), for
overlapping research teams (i.e., Author Overlap), for the replication having been published
in the same journal as the original study (i.e., Same Journal), for running the replication in
the same country as the original study and for laboratory experiments (i.e., Laboratory
Experiment).
Results from our estimation are reported in Table 2 as odds ratios.26 Model 1 indicates
that only the variable Same Implementation has a significant impact on the dependent
variable. In particular, the odds for a successful replication implemented in an identical
fashion to the original study are 3.91 times larger than the odds for successful replications
26 Ordered probit yields very similar estimations and therefore we opted for an ordered logit for its more intuitive interpretation of the
estimated coefficients.
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when the analyst departs from the protocol used in the original study. Other possible
determinants of replication success in our model do not appear to have predictive power at
conventional levels.
Table 2. Ordered Logit Regressions of Replication Success
Estimation method Ordered Logit Backw./Forw. Sel.Ordered Logit
Odds Ratio
Dep. variable: Success Model 1 Model 2
Citations Original Study 1.001 1.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Same Implementation 3.885** 4.877**
(2.607) (3.104)
Author Overlap 0.956
(0.579)
Same Journal 1.023
(0.662)
Same Country 1.543
(0.749)
Laboratory Experiment 1.360
(0.800)
Log-likelihood -76.890 -77.635
# Obs. 84 84
Notes: Success takes value 2 for a successful replication, 1 for a replication
with mixed results, and 0 for a failed replication. Citations Original Studies
counts the number of citations of the original study being replicated
(median=106; range=1–4691). Same Implementation takes the value 1 if the
implementation protocol of the original study and the replication are the
same and 0 otherwise. Author Overlap has value 1 if the original research
team has overlapping members with the replication team, and 0 otherwise.
Same Journal takes the value 1 if both the original and replication studies
are published in the same journal, and 0 otherwise. Same Country takes the
value 1 if both the original and replication studies were implemented in the
same country (0 otherwise). Laboratory Experiment reflects the nature of
the experiment and assumes value 1 for ‘conventional lab’, 0 for ‘field’
experiments. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
This comes to a certain extent with surprise given the evidence in Makel et al. (2012),
who obtained the intuitive result that having overlapping research teams or similar publishing
outlets play a significant role in understanding replication success. Moreover, it is worth
noting that even the variable Laboratory Experiment does not seem to have any impact on the
chances of success. We find it important to note that the lack of significant effects of our
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explanatory variables may either be due to a non-existing link between the dependent
variable and a given independent variable, but it might also result from the fact that in our
econometric analysis there are only 84 observations27 and our data are noisy. Given that the
majority of the dependent variables entered in Model 1 do not impact significantly on the
chances of success, we implemented both a backward and a forward selection procedure to
identify the more parsimonious model.
The two procedures lead to the same model, namely Model 2 in Table 2. This model
contains only Citations Original Study and Same Implementation as explanatory variables.
The former variable appears now significant at p < 0.10, but the magnitude of its effect on the
odds of success is very small. The coefficient of the variable Same Implementation appears to
slightly increase in the specification of Model 2, which does not present an important
worsening of the log-likelihood.
In summary, the only predictor of replication success that emerges from the
econometric analysis of our limited data set is Same Implementation. However, despite the
fact that citations of the original study do not explain the odds of success of a replication
attempt, it may still be interesting to examine the correlations between citations of replication
studies, citations of the original studies, and replication success: after all, many view citations
as the primary currency for the advancement of scholars’ careers. By testing for pairwise
correlation, it turns out that citations of replication studies are positively correlated with those
of the original study (correlation = 0.3215; p=0.003) and with the success of the replication
attempt (correlation = 0.2487; p=0.022).
5. A Tentative Meta-Research Assessment of Experimental Economics
In conducting our pilot empirical study we learned much about the transferability of meta-
research for economics. Despite our best efforts we realised that in the absence of a mature
27 One observation was dropped in the regression analysis due to missing values for some of the independent variables.
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culture in research reporting, meta-research endeavours suffer from a great degree of
subjectivity. Authors are hesitant to declare their study a replication and more so to indicate
the replication type. It is very difficult for the meta-researcher to gauge information beyond
authors’ reports. Accordingly, the results of our pilot study are tentative and higher quality
data will come from conceptual developments and more informative reporting. The overall
lessons are not very encouraging in terms of the easy transferability of meta-research
methods. Costly effort shall be needed in terms of changing reporting practices in the
discipline. An assessment of the opportunity-cost of those changes is very much needed for
economics. With this regard, a pivotal role may be played by professional associations,
funding agencies and scientific journals in assessing and, if beneficial, in promoting possible
changes.28
Bearing in mind the above considerations, what can we say about the experimental
economics literature on the basis of our model and pilot empirical results? Unlike clinical
trials in medicine, where funding agencies, pharmaceutical companies, and other bodies
support independent exact replications, our empirical study tentatively indicates that a
benchmark of 10 replications might be difficult to achieve in experimental economics. In
particular, about 4.2 percent of the published experimental papers in economics appear to
contain replications. This is somewhat larger than in psychology and marketing
(Evanschitzky et al., 2007; Makel et al., 2012), but of similar order of magnitude.
Accordingly, an average of 10 replications in today’s research publishing market is
probably too optimistic. Although the number of replications has increased substantially in
the last fifteen years, with the incentives for replication today we can think of three total
replications as a very optimistic scenario. Figure 3 illustrates this case for the same set of
parameters that we examined earlier. As can be seen, even two successful replications out of
28 For instance, changes in the reporting practices may start with the introduction of JEL codes for replication types; with a more
extensive use of the term ‘replication’ in the keywords; or, with stating the primary effect in the article highlights.
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three are able to establish a very good ܲܵܲ in our environment, provided that we are not in
the ‘sympathetic replication’ regime. Clearly, additional evidence is needed in order to
pinpoint the set of parameters with greater accuracy.
In particular, a key question is whether we can use the empirical evidence to infer
what kind of environment we currently reside within experimental economics. This is beyond
the scope of our study; however, we argue that survey tools can be devised to elicit the
perception of experimental economists concerning the preference of editors for replication
studies. In addition, it is possible that by comparing the results of the pre-registered
replications with the results of other replication studies we could more fully understand the
exact regime in place. Discrepancies may be interpreted as evidence of bias. Since as we have
shown the strength of bias depends on the incentives for finding certain types of results, this
can inform the possible direction of bias for experimental economists.
Figure 3. ܲܵܲ as a Function of Number of Replications out of 3 Attempts
a. (1 − β) = 0.7 b. (1 − β) = 0.2
Note: For the calculations, equations 1 and 5-7 were used while assuming that ߙ = 0.05,݊ = 3,ݒ= 0.3,߱ = 0.4,ߨ = 0.5,
߮ = 0.33,߰ = 0.33.
6. Conclusions
In this article, we illustrated the approach of incorporating meta-research tools in
examining the credibility of economics research, both theoretically and empirically, by
focusing on experimental economics. Our results about study reproducibility suggest that not
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enough information can be inferred about the credibility of our discipline on the basis of
existing evidence, and that replication should not be assumed to automatically work. In the
current context of the confidence crisis, economists should develop an awareness of the
dangers involved and foster institutions, incentives, and practices that prevent a confidence
drift or even strengthen the credibility of economic science. It is now time for economists to
understand where we stand, and where we should go in terms of the reliability of our
accumulated knowledge.
Increasingly, economists have turned to the experimental model of the physical
sciences as a method to understand human behaviour. Much of this research has taken the
form of laboratory experiments in which volunteers enter a research lab to make decisions in
a controlled environment. Over the past few decades, economists have increasingly made use
of field experiments to explore economic phenomena. Whether experimenting in the lab or
field, important open questions revolve around optimal experimentation and inference drawn
from the experiments. Accordingly, the degree to which we trust that experimental results are
credible is of particular import.
We believe that the work we have done in evaluating the evidence that has
accumulated so far does not allow for a general evaluation of the state of affairs in
experimental economics. Therefore, instead of proposing solutions to the (possible) crisis in
economics, we conclude our paper by emphasizing the need for two types of research: the
first concerns the type of research presented in our study. What is the current status of the
economics knowledge system? For example, is there bias in the way replication is conducted
in economics? In addition, what do we know about the publication system’s functioning,
incentive structure, prevalent culture, and the diverse stakeholders’ influence on the
knowledge accumulation? The latter requires research about economists’ research biases and
conflicts of interest (see Zingales, 2013).
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Moreover, other fields have accumulated enough evidence about these issues, and for
them the challenge appears to be to correct institutional incentives by designing appropriate
rules (Nosek et al., 2012). In fact, proposals for changing the rules of the game have attracted
great attention in several scientific disciplines (e.g., Simmons et al., 2011; Landis et al.,
2012; Fanelli, 2013; Miguel et al., 2014). Yet, the study of behavioural responses to
incentives provided by institutions is beyond the scope of these afflicted disciplines, and
therefore the proposed rule changes are not accompanied by rigorous evaluation. This
generates a clear and important role for economics to examine the trade-offs and
interdependencies of behaviour. We therefore call for a more central role of theoretical and
empirical mechanism design in attacking this potentially severe problem in modern science.
In this Features issue, Di Tillio et al. (forthcoming) illustrate the power of economic
theory by showing how strategic choice of the characteristics of an experimental subject can
lead to biased inference. Importantly, economic theory does not only offer a diagnosis, but it
‘dissects the patient’ showing what exact types of interventions are likely to work in a given
environment. This is fundamentally important before evaluating proposals for reforming
science. As Ioannidis (2012) has forcefully argued, rigorous evidence is required (including
experimental studies) in order to assess reform practices in science and to avoiding ending up
in a worse state of affairs.
University of Southampton
University of Nottingham
University of Chicago
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